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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #3749-80/1
22 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning


FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information.

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 20 May with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.

3. The constantly growing attendance at the monthly warning meeting on Africa is creating a minor problem. We have exhausted the facilities of the largest conference room in the building and may have to consider adjourning to the Auditorium next month.


L. Gray Cowan

Attachment
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SUBJECT: Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 19

STABILITY IN AFRICA

Analysts' agreed that a general warning should be issued concerning the growing instability of African regimes. The rash of coups and attempted coups which have taken place over the last few months are indicative of heightened instability of African governments. African regimes can be overthrown with little skill or organization; the threat of a coup stemming from unexpected or unknown sources is all the greater as a result.

UGANDA

The Ugandan situation remains marked by political instability, continuing lawlessness, rival military establishments, economic problems and strong tribal differences. We expect the present interim regime to continue until elections are held but only if the Tanzanian military presence remains. The overthrow of Binaisa has probably provided the Soviets and Cubans with the opportunity to expand their influence via their traditional military supply relationship.

INDIAN OCEAN ISLANDS (Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles)

Analysts believed that developments in these three countries require close watching, although no specific imminent warning note is called for. Increases in Soviet military aid and advisors and North Korean personnel were noted in Madagascar. The question of the quid pro quo for this aid is pertinent given the Soviet interest in acquiring access to Diego Suarez naval facility and ground facilities for air reconnaissance flights. Analysts urged that we increase our presently very limited collection capabilities in Madagascar.

Mauritius is ruled by an aging pro-West leader and the large Marxist opposition party (MMM) has increasing ability to gather votes as a result of local economic problems. Should the MMM come to power Mauritius would be oriented toward the East and would vigorously assert the Mauritian residual claim to Diego Garcia.

The Seychelles is of more immediate concern given President Rene's increasing anti-Western position and the delicate problem of the renegotiation of the US tracking station there. Seychelles' demand for a sizeable increase in rent for the US space tracking station is at least partially politically motivated. Political developments in the islands require close watching over the next three months.

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ETHIOPIA - SOMALIA

Analysts agreed that, for practical military reasons, a major Ethiopian ground attack against Somalia is not imminent. Air strikes remain the most likely form of Ethiopian response to continued Somali activity in the Ogaden. These raids will grow in intensity and may be directed against non-military targets in Somalia. Minor Ethiopian military operations across the border are possible and heightened guerilla activity may take place from the Somali side.

TANZANIA

Nyerere's political standing has been undermined by economic problems, corruption and government inefficiency, reducing his ability to dominate and control events in Tanzania. Analysts did not believe that his rule is currently threatened; concern was expressed, however, that the Tanzanian military may become more assertive and more active politically. Nyerere's awareness of his declining position may result in a significant reshuffling of key military and Ministry of Defense officials prior to the Tanzanian election in October. This could precipitate a move by disgruntled military officers, especially if they perceive Nyerere's political position to be weak. Some analysts speculated that the regime might seek a foreign scapegoat (possibly UK) to divert popular attention.

ZAMBIA

Zambia represents a significant opportunity for ^{25X1} Soviet inroads into southern Africa despite Kaunda's obvious suspicion of the Soviets and doubts about the firmness of his arms deal with the Soviet Union. Kaunda's position is apparently weakening as a result of grave economic problems, labor and tribal unrest and a military humiliated by past attacks launched by Rhodesia and South Africa. The Liberian example has not been lost on the junior officer corps dominated by the Bemba tribal group in which opposition to Kaunda is concentrated. Kaunda appears more nervous about his position than he has previously. Analysts felt that Zambia should be closely watched both for signs of instability of the regime and increased opportunities for the Soviet Union.

WEST AFRICA

Analysts continued to express concern regarding the example of Liberia for other West African countries. While calm on the surface, Liberia has an extremely fragile regime that contains within it ideological differences, ethnic problems, and economic difficulties. The inability of a new government to meet rising popular expectations, particularly among the military, poses a significant problem to the new regime, as does the unfavorable climate for foreign investment. Is the Doe coup a one-act play or only the opening of a three-acter?

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The future stability of the Limann government in Ghana continues to be of concern, especially in view of the anniversary next month of the Rawlings coup.

Continuing conflict in Chad, now almost guaranteed by the French withdrawal, has increased the refugee burden on Cameroon and presents growing opportunity for direct Libyan military involvement.

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